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Colin Crouch
Industn'al Relations in Western Europe: Patterns of Change
1)
Since the late 1960s there have been three broad phases in the development of
industrial relations: (a) the initial rise in the level of conflict associated
with growing shop-floor strength; (b) a period of political activity at na¬
tional level, with intensive exchanges between unions and the State - this
took place while the shop-floor developments were still important; (c) pro-
longed recession since 1974, in the wake of the rises in oil and other
commodity prices; the political exchanges and shop-floor activity have con-
tinued, but now in conditions of weakness for the labour movement, high un-
employraent and a conservative shift in economic policy.
The first phase has been extensively discussed in the literature.
' It was
noticable in nearly all western European countries in the late 1960s: most
dramatically but most superficially in France; strengest in Italy and Britain;
but also experienced in the Federal Republic, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium
and elsewhere. There have been several attempted explanations of the phenomenon.
Sorae authors have emphasised the growing expectations of a working class which
had come to take for granted post-war prosperity.
' However, while there are
sorae merits in this account, it fails to give adequate attention to changes
taking place in the international economy. It was becoming increasingly diffi-
cult for capital to realise large profits, leaving less room for raanoeuvre
in its relations with labour, and leading to pressure for work intensification,
rationalisation, etc. ' These long-term developroentswere sharpened by
conjunctural problems resulting frora the difficulties of the United States
government in financing the Vietnam War, which generated international in-
flation.
Common tendencies in all the countries involved were a rise in unofficial
strikes, the development of shop-floor representatives with considerable in-
dependence from the union leaderships, the Organisation of groups of workers
who had previously not been involved in unions or at least whose unions had
not been at all militant. Against that common background however there were
important differences. In the countries with highly institutionalised Systems
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of conflict regulation and centralised, social-democratic labour movements
(the Federal Republic, Austria, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands) the
rise in conflict was far less and the development of Virtually autonomous
shop-floor movements was more contained than elsewhere.
France and Italy, two countries often linked in discussions of industrial con¬
flict on account of their divided union movements, strong Communist parties
and low level of institutionalisation, began to diverge sharply. The recently
industrialised cities of northern Italy developed rapidly a depth of shop-
floor Organisation and bargaining power rivalling that of Britain, and while
these developments created considerable difficulties for union leaderships
(including for example greater autonomy of the industrial unions from the
confederations), the confederations were able to overcome some of the weaknesses
imparted by their divisions by developing a partial de facto unity. In France,
in contrast, the level of unionisation remained low, and although shop-floor
strength developed it was still difficult for workers to make many gains in
relations with employers. British developments were different again. Britain
has always lacked the divisions in the union movement characteristic of some
Continental cases, but it hardly has an Einheitsgewerkschaft, union strength
and bargaining power in so many unions being decentralised and fragmented.
This meant that the move to shop-floor power was already well established
there, with a high level of unofficial strikes and an important shop-stewards
movement.
The shift in the level of conflict to the Shop floor at first entailed a
change in the pattern of union activity away from the level of national leader¬
ships; in France and to a lesser extent Italy this also meant a shift away
from the national political level - French unions in particular having tradi-
tionally directed much of their mobilisation at the State because of both
their weakness in relations with employers and the dominant role of the State
in French economic life. However, an intensification of political activity
soon followed the shop-floor developments, constituting what I have called
the second phase. The result of these two shifts - to both the shop floor and
the national polity - was to reduce the relative role of conventional industry-
level collective bargaining, which had in several countries been central to
the establishment of "orderly" industrial relations in the post-war period
(a process of change which had been evident in Britain since at least the
early 1960s, but which began to occur rapidly in several other countries by
the end of the decade).
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The shift to the political level was clearly related to the resurgence of
shop-floor conflict, but in complex and deeply ambiguous ways. Most obviously,
governments (and perhaps employers' spokesraen and some union leaderships)
were
trying to re-institutionalise conflict, to adjust the basis of incorporation
of labour to take account of the new shop-floor strength. But at the same time
there is some evidence that organised labour was using its new-found power to
make demands at the political level which it could not achieve in plant-level
demands from employers. While it is easy to define these two rather different,
if not contradictory, causes, it is very difficult to disentangle them in
practice. Often a policy development was successful precisely because it could
be seen to fulfil both functions, enabling a consensus to be reached; and the
motivations of national union leaderships may themselves have been mixed. For
example, it has been suggested that, in making political demands for social
reform in transport, health and housing policy, the Italian unions were de-
liberately moving the area of conflict to issues where they alone, and not the
plant representatives, could control the action.
The only case of a political change that was implemented without general
agreement was the British Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which was strongly
opposed by the unions; it is significant that this Act never fully implemented
and was repealed in 1974. Although that Act had included several concessions to
labour - improvements to workers1 and unions' legal rights, primarily in order
to reduce the use of industrial conflict to secure rights - its main thrust
was both to weaken unions' rights at law and to impose on them legal liabilities
to regulate their own members. Such a use of repression was unusual in the poli¬
tical response to shop-floor conflict in the period. (It did however figure
in internal union discipline, in police action, employers' actions, especially
in France, where workers' representatives were often dismissed, and in the law
courts, especially in German Rechtsprechung, though it is notable that not
much use was made of the legal powers to punish unofficial strikers which were
available in several countries, including Germany and Sweden).
There was sufficient in common between different countries to give a summary
account of what developments did take place, though recognition needs to be
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given to several important national differences. There were:
(i) attempts at drawing union leaders into national forums with governments
and employers, in which discussions of national economic policy would be
used to persuade the unions to restrain wage demands while the unions would
try to influence economic policy. These developments went furthest in Germany,
Sweden and the Netherlands, where such mechanisms already existed - for example,
in Konzertierte Aktion, or in the extensive discussions (based on shared econo¬
mic modeis) between the Swedish union confederation LO and the employers1
federation SAF. In Italy and especially France these developments proved far
more difficult because of the long estrangement between unions, governraent and
employers. The French government made several attempts to bring unions and
employers together in national talks, offering to under-write with legislation
any agreement which emerged. Given the deadlocked nature of the Italian State
the main initiatives in national relations with the unions came from a group
of "progressive" employers, developments at the political level being dependent
on the role of the Communist Party (see under (ii) below). The British case,
as so often, feil between these two groups (those where institutionalised
forums were already in existence or easy to establish, and those where the
institutional vacuum in state-union relations was not easily filled). British
unions, being neither politically isolated nor politically divided, have little
difficulty joining national discussions, while the accommodative pattern of
British politics makes it easy for even Conservative governments to offer them
participation. On the other hand the decentralised structure of British unions,
together with certain features of British political economy^', means that very
little is ever achieved by unions in these forums. The British Situation is
therefore characterised by a proliferation of short-lived tripartite bodies,
and this has been particularly true during the 1970s.
Assessment of the impact of these developments in the various countries is not
easy, because one cannot determine what would have happened if the forum con-
cerned did not exist. The Italian and French ventures being significant mainly
for the fact that the attempt was being made, one is unlikely even to look for
Substantive outcomes. However, even in the German and Swedish cases it is not
clear what can be attributed to the formal tripartite discussions. Few observers
are willing to Claim many achievements for Konzertierte Aktion after 1969 6),
and this earlier period was the cause of rather than a response to an outbreak
of shop-floor conflict! However, even if some of the wage moderation of
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German unions can be attributed to participation in Konzertierte Aktion, it is
difficult to discover what gains the unions were able to make through it. The
Swedish Situation may be slightly different, in that the dose relations bet-
ween government, unions and employers in that country were probably important
in containing both wages and unemployment for much of the 1970s. The British
so-called social contract probably did lead to a temporary and successful
effort at wage restraint by the unions for two or three years following the
25 % infiation that occurred in 1975, though rising unemployment was weakening
union power at the same time. It is however difficult to identify any gains in
determining economic policy which the unions achieved in exchange - gains of
other kinds are discussed below.
(ii) Union-party links: In all countries a crucial interraediary link in re-
lating unions raore closely to governraent has been the labour-movement political
parties. To some extent the new political role being adopted by the unions has
"usurped" some of the traditional work of the parties '. The countries with
settled institutionalised Systems have also been those in which social-democratic
parties either dominated coalitions (Sweden, the Federal Republic) or were
members of them (the Netherlands) during the early 1970s. These party links
were clearly important. In Sweden the longevity of social-democratic rule was
a major element in establishing the trust between unions and government which
made at least the early stages of the gathering new crisis relatively easy
to manage. In Germany the accession to Office of the Social Democrats in the
latter 1960s had paved the way for the establishment of Konzertierte Aktion
and probably made it easier for reforms favourable to union interests to be
introduced in the 1970s. At the same time the wery close ties between union
leaderships and the SPD Bundestagsfraktion contributed to union willingness
to ease the tensions which were emerging in the industrial relations System.
The British case is slightly different. It will in general be true that, the
more fragmented a union movement the less able will it be to deliver any
commitments to a political party, because union-party links can only really
operate at the level of national leaderships. This has been evident in Britain
in various major breakdowns in relations in union-party relations, each of
which contributed to the fall of a Labour governraent (in 1950, 1969 and 1979).
On the other hand the relations between unions and party in Britain are
particularly close, and are unusual in that the unions have in general more
leverage over the party than vice versa. These links have become increasingly
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important during the 1970s as industrial relations has moved to the centre
of political controversy (this itself marking a distinct change in ßritish
politics). Given both the strength and the undoubted unpopularity of ßritish
unions, the Conservative Party has become clearly identified as an "anti-
union" party, even though when in government in the early 1970s it eventually
tried to overcome this obstacle to a working relationship with union leaders.
These various factors have combined to give a distinct and uneven rhythm to
party-union links in Britain. After a breach in relations between the Labour
Party and the unions in 1969 resulting from statutory incomes policy and
the Labour government's attempts at legislation hostile to the unions, the
links became stronqer than ever during the subsequent Conservative government
as a response to j_ts attempts at union legislation. The union-party link was
then used by Labour in 1974 as its alternative to an incomes policy, but by
1975 it had become the vehicle by which an incomes policy was agreed8). This
party configuration helps explain the pattern, unique to Britain, of a primarily
repressive Industrial Relations Act being passed in 1971, to be superseded by
Acts highly favourable to the unions in 1974-76.
But union-party links are also important to union-government links in the
countries where the latter are weakest: France and Italy. While the pattern
in both has differed widely, the issue in both cases is the political
incorporation of the Communist Party. The possibilities have been greater
in Italy because of the instability of governments of the right, the national
strength of the Communist Party (PCI) and the strength of the unions. The
Communist Party needs to establish its respectability as a party of government,
while Christian Democracy (DC) needs an agreement with the PCI in order to bring
some kind of order to the country. As part of the many-faceted means by which
an accomodation is reached between them, the Party has been willing to press
the unions into forms of tacit wage restraint, while the DC has been willing
to Sponsor measures favourable to the unions. Paradoxically, although when the
Italian left was weak in the 1950s and early 1960s the PCI probably could have
exercised central influence over the unions,the very strengthening of the left
which has put the Party in its new national position is the result of a
strenghening of autonomous shop-floor power of almost British dimensions. The
record has therefore been patchy and difficult, but it does enable Italy to
be numbered among those countries where party-union links have been important
in attempts at restabilising industrial relations in the wake of conflict.
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French developments have been more a case of "might have been", of potential
but frustrated Italianisation. For the early part of the 1970s the energies
of parties and unions of the left were devoted to forging the union de 1a
gauche that would eventually bring political victory in national elections.
If that strategy had been successful, the union-party relation would have
been placed in a highly interesting position, while under the existing
Gaullist or Giscardian regimes there could be no development at all on this
dimension. The collapse of the union shortly before the elections of 1977 -
a collapse possibly precipitated by a Communist Party unwilling to take on
the kind of responsibility for steering through a major recession with which
the Italian party had been burdened - preceded electoral defeat. France re-
raains the country of Europe where the role of parties in the attempted re-
institutionalisation of conflict is least developed.
(iii) The unions' position in the plant: The pattern of institutionalisation
which had developed in most countries in the post-war years had included the
exclusion of unions from direct activity within the plant, or at least a
concentration of union-employer relations at extra-plant levels - the region,
the industry, the economy as a whole. The effect of this was to distance union
activity from the workers, and to leave employers in unchallenged authority
within their firms. The phenomenon is seen at its clearest in the Netherlands,
where a very deep involvement of unions at all levels outside the plant
accompanied a total exclusion of unions from the plant itself, in favour of
bipartite works Councils under employer domination. Similar patterns existed
elsewhere. In France and Italy the sheer resistance of employers to weak
unions kept union activity to trying to make industry-level bargains or de-
mands from the government. Comites d'entreprise and consigli di fabbrica
provided a very weak form of non-union plant representation. Most highly
developed of all has been the German Betriebsrat System (discussed in detail
in other papers in this Symposium), which was ironically more successful in
institutionalising conflict because it provided a more effective System of
representation. The Betriebsräte differed from other works Council Systems
in consisting of workers' representatives alone, and in having a wider ränge
of rights to affect matters of importance to the work-force. At the same time
the unions were prepared to work through them as the nearest they could
approximate to a union plant role, partly because of their potential effective-
ness, partly because an Einheitsgewerkschaft was in a better position than
divided movements to make use of the Betriebsräte, and partly because of the
German unions' own historical attachment to a Rätesystem.
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The British System appears soraewhat different in view of the development
of a strong shop-steward movement. However, the main thrust of union-
employer relations in the post-war years was definitely at the industry
level; industrial relations experts in the 1950s would probably have
designated Joint consultation comraittees as being the effective plant-
level mechanisin of representation, these committees being not unlike works
Councils though on a characteristically British non-statutory basis. The
development of shop Stewards capable of bargaining atplant level with
management gradually reduced Joint consultation to an irrelevance in many
parts of the private sector during the latter 1950s and 1960s, eventually
spreading to the public Services in the 1970s. However, although this was
in some senses a union voice, in that shop Stewards are union representatives,
the System developed in considerable autonomy from the official union
structure, so that by the late 1960s observers spoke of the "two Systems"
of industrial relations. ' Though a different route, therefore, Britain
had by the end of the 1960s a pattern similar to that elsewhere of an
emerging level of plant activity that by-passed whatever formal machinery
existed and was also autonomous of the union leaderships.
In several countries the Situation in the late 1960s was a case of the
internal contradictions of the System of institutionalisation becoming
manifest: the very exclusion of the unions from the plant that had been
a basis of stability for capital now began to create problems for it,
as an autonomous level of representation developed which was not so easily
accommodated as the official unions. The response in each country was to
provide for a greater union plant role, to integrate the plant-level
movement with the formal structure. Before this development can be entirely
accounted for in terms of re-institutionalisation, however, it needs also
to be seen as a successful drive by the unions for a plant role. As already
suggested, these developments are füll of ambiguity.
The I tau an Statuto dei Lavoratori gaye unions a formal right to plant
activity which they had never possessed before, though some observers saw
this as an attempt at incorporating autonomous shop Stewards under the
wing of the formal unions. Various enactments in France introduced similar
rights. These two Systems, which had previously given the workers least,
had to make the most concessions because they included so little prior
Provision for this kind of activity. The German model was more strongly
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rooted; the very fact that the Betriebsräte were in some respects a de facto
union Channel made it easier to accommodate growing shop-floor strength by
extending both the powers of the Betriebsräte and the unions' role within
them. That there is still considerable uncertainty over whether the consequence
of this has been a strengthening or weakening of organised labour in the plant
can be seen frora the papers by Streeck and Müller-Jentsch at this Symposium.
British policy on this question has been less clear, partly because the growth
of shop-floor power is there more deeply established, more free of legal
constraint and longer established than elsewhere, and partly because of the
changes of government during the 1970s. The Report of the Royal Commission
on Trade Unions and Employers Associations in 1968
' advocated quite
explicitly a policy of incorporation towards shop-floor activism, to be
achieved through voluntary deals between employers and unions with government
assistance. The Conservative Industrial Relations Act of 1971 changed direction
towards a use of legal sanctions on union leaderships to keep their members in
order, but as already noted this Act made little impact. Since then there have
been no major initiatives aimed at incorporating shop-floor strength other
than any internal arrangements which unions have made in order to improve
their own ability to co-operate with the Labour government.
(iv) Extensions of union and worker rights: A further development of the
1970s has been the improvement of union rights of recognition - the rights of
union plant representatives - employee rights to union representation, to
protection from unfair dismissal, and to health and safety protection. These
were included in the Italian legislation of 1970; in British and Swedish
legisiation in the early 1970s; by way of extensions to the rights of
Betriebsräte in the Federal Republic; and to a certain extent in some French
enactments. In several cases - West Germany, and the safety and health legis¬
lation in Sweden and the United Kingdom, these rights took the form of greater
involvement by workers' representatives in administration of the new Standards,
rather than straightforward administration by State officials. This last
element clearly links these measures to the resurgence of interest by workers
in plant-level determination of their working conditions. The measures were
fairly unambiguous gains on behalf of workers, though it is also possible to
interpret them as attempts at institutionalisation: if a dispute over dis¬
missal or a safety prpblem can be resolved through legally guaranteed Channels
it is less likely to provide a focus for mobilisation for autonomous Shop-
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floor representatives. (The German case has of course long provided a success-
ful example of such a strategy: the fact that Betriebsräte are able to take
action through official, co-operative Channels on a wide ränge of issues
limits the potential scope for work by autonomous Vertrauensleute.) In a
strongly organised plant the legally guaranteed rights will often be less
favourable to the workforce than could have been achieved by autonomous workers'
action - though the opposite will be true in weakly organised ones, which raay
well constitute the majority of areas of employment in most countries. A final
aspect of institutionalisation is that, while some of this legalisation extended
the scope of shop-floor representatives working through formal Channels, in
other respects it shifted responsibility away from informal representatives to
union officials: a shop Steward can organise a strike against the dismissal of
a work-mate, but a union official is needed to advise on legal rights against
dismissal.
(v) Co-determination: A final major area of policy debate in several countries
concerned worker participation in management, or even workers1 control. However,
practical developments have been less impressive than the debate. The French
CFDT has discussed autogestion at great depth, but there is little prospect of
any real development on the question in France: the Slogan of participation
which General de Gaulle copied from the Student demonstrators in 1968 has remained
a Slogan. The Italian unions have begun to discuss and to deraand forms of worker
participation, but again so far without a political response. The two countries
where major developments did take place were, again, countries where existing
mechanisms of institutionalised conflict were most deeply entrenched: Sweden
and Germany - though differences in the forms taken by policies in the two
countries reflect important differences in the respective positions of the two
labour movements. In the Federal Republic the existence of widespread experience
with parity Mitbestimmung in the Montanbereich and the more limited one-third
pattern elsewhere in firms covered by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz made it
that much easier for further developments to take place: the unions were used
to working through co-determination and actively sought extensions to it, and
the government was prepared to make the changes. Even so, the Mitbestimmungsge¬
setz of 1976 saw no true parity in Mitbestimmung and was nevertheless bitterly
opposed by the employers. The Swedish unions were by no means so certain that
they wanted co-determination; centralised and institutionalised though their
bargaining may be, the Swedish unions have always been far more strongly committed
to bargaining than to participation in managerial decisions. However, by the
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early 1970s they slightly changed this approach. They believed that further
progress in bargaining at the Company level in many areas could only be
achieved with more detailed knowledge of Company policy, especially in
technically sophisticated areas and companies with complex internal structure.
They therefore advocated a form of co-determination aimed primarily at ira-
proving the flow of information to them that would be useful for bargaining;
as a result they were quite content with minority representation on Company
boards, since they were not primarily interested in voting strength in board
decisions.
Again therefore we have, with important differences between individual
countries, a distinction between the north European nations, where existing
patterns of institutionalisation were most advanced, where the disruption to
these in the late 1960s was least, and where most progress could be made on
further developments - and the "Latin" countries, where existing levels of
conflict had been higher and less contained, the resurgence of the late 1960s
was stronger and progress in constructing new institutions was weaker. And
again the United Kingdom Stands between the two, developing aspirations towards
the former pattern but failing to fulfil them. ßritish unions' long-standing
aversion to co-determination seemed to be changing in the early 1970s, and by
1974 the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and Labour government became committed
to the introduction of a scheme of worker participation. The motives of those
advocating such a scheme, both within the unions and outside, ranged from
"German" plans for reducing conflict and more effectively incorporating labour
to "Swedish" ambitions at extending bargaining through board-level represen¬
tation; the differences are reflected within the majority report of the Bullock
Committee appointed on the subject, which proposed an ambitious scheme of
parity worker representation organised through trade-union channnels. However,
by the time the report appeared in 1977 the high tide of union influence on
government policy had waned; the unions had anyway become deeply divided over
the threat to traditional bargaining which co-determination might pose; and
the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) was even more strongly hostile
than the German employers had been to any extensions of co-determination. The
government therefore produced heavily diluted plans for minority representation
and the idea virtually disappeared from political debate.
Did all this activity across a ränge of issues in different countries
amount to a successful re-institutionalisation of conflict in the early 1970s?
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Some of the evidence permits a positive answer to that question. If post-war
institutionalisation had included the Separation of unions from the plant, a
new model was certainly being developed based on incorporation of a union
plant role. If the post-war settlement had depended on a distinct division
of labour between politics and industrial affairs, the new attempts tried to
incorporate union leaderships within a System of national politico-economic
responsibility. And the success of these developments seemed likely to be
dependent on how successful the initial post-war institutionalisation had been.
On the other hand, the new developments were, as has been stressed here,
ambiguous; at both plant and national-political levels concessions had to be
made which might well advance the real strength of organised labour at points
more sensitive than had been exposed to labour influence through industry-level
bargaining. But a füll er assessment of the matter cannot be made without
examining the economic Supports to institutionalisation, and this in turn re-
quires attention to what was identified at the outset as the third phase of
post-1960s development: world recession, high unemployment and the replacement
of a permissive international Keynesianism by a conservative monetarist
orthodoxy.
The superficial cause of the shift in international economics around 1973-74
was the wave of price rises in raw materials and oil. There were however deeper
causes in capital's problems of accumulation as the wave of unprecedented
economic growth unleashed by post-war reconstruction and technological
development finally petered out. Capital sought new, cheaper labour markets
in Third World dictatorships untroubled by organised labour, and various
technical developments made it possible to move production to locations of
this kind. ' At home, new investment was increasingly taking the form of
labour-saving rationalisation rather than job-creating extensions of capacity.
Finally, at the political level labour was caught off guard by the inflation
which followed the increases in commodity prices and the increasing expense
to governments of maintaining füll employment. Inflation made both free
collective bargaining and Keynesian economic policy into "problems", culprits
even, and these had been the two main Supports of labour's political and
economic strength within liberal capitalist countries since the Second World
War. The intensification of pressure on unions for wage restraint and on
governments to move from Keynesian to monetarist policies therefore threatened
a massive reversal of that resurgence of labour strength which had taken place
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at the plant and political levels since the late 1960s. What the unions had,
characteristically, gained through political and organisational strength, capital
was now, equally characteristically, challenging through market forces; class
against party, in Weber's terms.
The effects of this major change in the politico-economic climate can be seen
in nearly all countries, though in highly varied ways. The clearest case is
perhaps France, where labour's strength has remained weakest. In the wake of
the final proof of the weakness of the French left in the 1977 elections the
Giscardiangovernment moved to a more tautly "liberal" economic policy than had
ever been practised under Gaullist paternalism: long-established price controls
were abolished, little help was extended by government to declining industries,
and both unemployment and Inflation have worsened.
The switch to a monetarist regime was also comparatively easy in Germany, where
there was both an existing central-bank autonomy with preference for tight-money
policies and a lower level of crisis because of the continuing underlying
strength of the economy. Here the deeply incorporated position of the labour
movement enables monetarism to be pursued alongside continued union moderation,
though with distinct and increasing signs of tension. By 1976 Britain had raoved
to a position similar to that of the Federal Republic, though with far greater
conflict and less success. The weakness of the economy, the strength of the
unions and their estrangement from the Conservative government of the early 1970s
created a far stronger inflationary thrust and consequently greater political
difficulty in switching to a tight-money policy. However, by autumn 1976 a
collapse of the pound Sterling and the intervention of the International Monetary
Fund brought the Labour government to heel, and a pattern of union moderation
alongside a social-democratic government commtted to monetarism and continued
high unemployment was temporarily established. Italy developed a not dissimilar
but even less stable pattern following a collapse like that in Britain. Here
however union-government co-operation was less well founded because it depended
on the tentative new relationship between PCI and DC. As part of their price for
co-operation the unions were able to retain the scala mobile, which adjusted
wages to rises in the cost of living and ensured that high inflation would
continue.
Sweden remained a temporary exception. Social-democratic policy being more
advanced there, there were major attempts at persisting in the pursuit of füll
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employment, partly by stock-piling continued production in the expectation
of an international economic recovery. When this failed to raaterialise the
Swedish economy moved into recession, and now with a conservative-led gover-
ment in office unlikely to make experiments to support füll employment which
might have been expected from the social democrats. However, union moderation
has not been entirely broken by these developments, and the future course of
events in Sweden remains unclear.
The distribution of countries is therefore different from that which was en-
countered when discussing attempts at re-institutionalisation, because it
reflects differences in the relative strength of capital and labour in the
different countries - the extent of existing institutionalisation in a society
is not priraarily determined by this. Capital's Position has proved to be
stronger in France and Germany than in the other countries, though the existing
patterns of institutions have led to great differences in the way that strength,
and the lack of it elsewhere, is expressed.
Recession obviously weakens labour, but it does not weaken it universally;
important points of strength survive. Further, labour's economic weakness does
not necessarily mean an absence of conflict or guarantee social stability; very
much the reverse. There is at the present time little sign of any lasting re-
duction of conflict in France, Britain or Italy, while conflict levels in
Germany and Sweden, though still low, are rising.
It is in this context that the question of whether there has been a new in¬
stitutionalisation of conflict needs to be assessed. Institutional structures
cannot by themselves determine the degree of order in industrial relations.
If the post-war period saw a "successful" institutionalisation in several
countries, it was because institutional patterns were supported by rising
mass prosperity and growing security of employment. The economic support for
any re-institutionalisation in the 1970s consists of prolonged recession an'd
higher unemployment. When this is combined with the essential ambiguity of the
institutional developments of the early 1970s it becomes clear that no effective
base for a re-stabilisation of industrial relations has been laid at all.
Temporarily a stränge coalition of monetarism and trade-union co-operation
in wage restraint has maintained some kind of equilibrium in several countries,
but it is unlikely to provide a lasting base; the unfabourable economic policies
destroy the base of trust on which government-union co-operation has to be
built.
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Despite international differences, one may venture the generali'sation that,
since the late 1960s, labour has made important gains in its shop-floor
Organisation and in the acquisition of new rights which are nevertheless highly
ambiguous. It has made very little progress, indeed probably the opposite, on
questions of the conduct of economic policy. Unless there is a major improve-
ment in the world economy, one can only predict that the continuing tendency
for economic forces to develop unfavourably will intensify the level of
conflict in industrial relations. The struggles will be deep because of
labour's shop-floor strength and they will be politicised, because of labour's
inevitable role in relations with the State. But in most countries labour is
ill equipped for anything other than defensive resistance. Labour market
developments are likely to be unfavourable; workers' skills, the basis of
labour movement strength, are being eroded; employment is moving to areas
where labour is docile and controlled; capitai can operate internationally,
while labour is virtually incapable of transcending national boundaries.
Labour has some potential leverage on the issue of investment. Capital always
argues that wage restraint, leading to higher profits, will create more invest¬
ment, which will create Jobs. This probably worked in the 1950s and 1960s
-
at least in Germany and Sweden, though probably not in the UK, where capital
has long been oriented to overseas markets and to non-productive domestic
sectors. It is doubtful whether it works so effectively now. The investment
which follows the higher profits is more likely to go to Brazil, Korea or
South Africa than to the country in which the wage restraint made the profits
possible; and any investment which does take place is as likely to destroy
as to create employment. Unions have therefore made demands for an increased
government role in investment, usually through institutions in which they are
themselves involved as their price for co-operation. Demands of this kind are
most advanced in Sweden ' but there are echoes of them in Germany and Britain
too. Will this provide a new arena for labour-movement pressure, one striking
at the centre of capital's claim to domination? With the possible exception
of Sweden, where shop-floor strength and national leadership appear unusually
well integrated (partly a result of the small size of the working population),
there is not much prospect of radical development. As the late 1960s and early
1970s showed, it is the shop-floor base of the labour-movement which is most
likely to create problems for capital and escape incorporation. But a demand
for a share in control over investment, or for a particular government invest-
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ment policy, is a demand that must emerge from a labour-movement leadership;
it is not the kind of demand that originates at shop-floor level. In raost
countries of western Europe this may prove to be the labour raoveraent's raain
limitation as it tries to improve its Position within the constantly varying
balance of forces. In those countries (such as Germany) where the movement
is capable of central Strategie decision-raaking, it lacks the shop-floor base
which would force it to adopt radical Stands; in those countries (such as
Britain) where it has a powerful decentralised base, it is incapable of
strategy.
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